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Abstract
We find that debt-financed government spending multipliers vary considerably
depending on the location of the debt holder. In a sample of 59 countries we find that
government spending multipliers are larger when government purchases are financed
by issuing debt to foreign investors (non-residents), compared to the case when
government purchases are financed by issuing debt to home investors (residents). In
a theoretical model we show that the location of the government debt holder produces
these diﬀerential responses through the extent that private investment is crowded
out in each case. Increasing international capital mobility of the resident private
sector decreases the diﬀerence between the two types of financing, a prediction,
which is also confirmed by the data. The share of rule-of-thumb workers, as well as
the strength of the public good in the utility function play a key role in generating
model-based fiscal multipliers, which are quantitatively comparable with those of
the data.
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restrictions, small open economy, structural vector autoregressions
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1 Introduction
Since the onset of the European debt crisis in 2009 several European economies have
embarked on measures to reduce their government spending in the view of improving
their fiscal positions and returning to growth. During this ongoing process a number of
the leading actors in the European crisis have prescribed policies, which have triggered a
heated economic debate with regards to their prospects for economic recovery. Since 2013,
the focus of attention has been the size of fiscal multipliers. This debate was revitalized
at the same time when statistics of progress were published for countries like Greece, Italy
and Spain, which had failed to recur to pre-crisis growth rates.
The question we attempt to answer in this paper is whether the transmission mecha-
nism of a fiscal shock depends on the government’s source of borrowing. Economic theory,
but also our empirical investigation, suggest that a government spending shock can pro-
duce diﬀerential eﬀects on the real economy if it is financed with debt issued to home
investors (residents), or debt issued to foreign investors (non-residents). These diﬀerences
extend to the size of fiscal multipliers, which in particular are larger when government
spending is financed with debt placed abroad.
We approach the question in a twofold way. First, we construct a small open econ-
omy model with a government that finances its spending by borrowing domestically and
abroad, and a domestic private sector, which faces financial frictions in borrowing abroad.
We show that the key mechanism for obtaining diﬀering fiscal multipliers fundamentally
relies on the composition of the economy’s resource constraint. If the private sector is
restricted in its external borrowing then domestic government borrowing takes resources
from the private sector that can no longer be invested. Instead, if the government borrows
abroad, the government acquires resources from abroad so that domestic investment need
not fall; to the contrary, we show that it may even rise, ultimately implying that the fiscal
multiplier is larger when spending is financed with debt held abroad.
The severity of the private sector’s financial friction is crucial in determining whether
domestic government borrowing will displace investment. If foreign credit markets func-
tioned perfectly then purchases of government debt could be fully financed by external
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borrowing thus avoiding the displacement of investment following a spending shock. We
show how the openness of foreign external markets matters for the magnitude of fiscal
multipliers.
Armed with this intuition, we then study the responses of output, investment, and
consumption to domestic and foreign debt-financed government spending shocks in a
structural vector-autoregression (SVAR). Given the rarity of available data on the domes-
tic and foreign components of aggregate public debt, we develop an innovative conceptual
framework for identification.1 We distinguish between a home debt-financed and a foreign
debt-financed spending shock by extending the conventional sign restrictions approach of
Canova and de Nicolo (2003) to include magnitude restrictions in the spirit of Kilian and
Murphy (2012). Our sign restrictions limit the responses of the endogenous variables in a
way that is robust to a wide class of theoretical models, whilst we derive our magnitude
restrictions by relying on a single assumption regarding the movements of the unobserved
components of aggregate public debt and aggregate public external debt. In particular,
following a home (foreign) debt-financed fiscal shock we require public debt to increase by
more (less) than external debt. We show that this assumption is in line with the response
of the current account in our theoretical model and in addition, is accepted by a large
part of the empirical literature on fiscal policy. To further verify our proposed method of
identification we estimate the same SVAR on US data, for which the disaggregated debt
components of interest are available. We show that our methodology indeed extracts the
relevant shocks in the US.
Our work ties in with several branches of the fiscal policy literature. On the empirical
side, studies relying on the SVAR methodology consist of Blanchard and Perotti (1999);
Fatas and Mihov (2001); Perotti (2005) among others. The conclusions generally suggest
that private consumption, output, employment and the real wage increase with the fiscal
shock, features which are all consistent with the results obtained in this paper. However,
most of these studies do not allow for a flexible specification of how the spending shock is
financed. This gap in the literature presumably arises because of the diﬃculty in obtaining
1For example, data on public debt from the World Bank only reports ’central government debt’ (Indica-
tor code: GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS) and ’external debt stocks’ (Indicator code: DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS).
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accurate data on the components of aggregate public debt. In this paper, we fill precisely
this gap.
On the theoretical side, there is little work analyzing the eﬀects of fiscal shocks to the
real economy when the location of debt-financing is assessed. The closest study to ours is
recent work by Shen and Yang (2012), who analyze the eﬀects of government spending in a
setting of limited capital mobility that is specific to developing countries. They show that
in such an environment an externally-financed fiscal shock can reduce the crowding out
of investment, but also generates a real appreciation of the exchange rate, which oﬀsets
the expansionary eﬀects on output.
Our results can also be interpreted as an extension and empirical validation of Broner
et al. (2014). Similar to this paper, they discuss how the purchases of government debt
made by domestic creditors can cause investment to be crowded out unless financial mar-
kets are perfectly functional. Their focus however, is on the government’s borrowing
policy, which is determined by introducing creditor discrimination on the basis that do-
mestic debt is harder to be defaulted on, thus oﬀering a large expected return to domestic
creditors. Here, we extend their message by concentrating on the implications of the
financing of spending for the size of the fiscal multiplier. As we show, the response of
investment following a spending shock is key in aﬀecting the multiplier.
On the policy front our analysis has implications for the eﬀects of fiscal consolidations
in several European countries. Since foreign debt-financed spending shocks have higher
multipliers this suggests that in countries such as Greece, where most of the debt is ex-
ternally held, government expenditure cuts can cause deeper than anticipated recessions.
This is opposed to the case of Italy, where the majority of government debt is domestically
held. Thus, the composition of public debt alone can play a role in determining the busi-
ness cycle absent any additional debt issuance. As can be seen in Figure (1.1) this issue
is mostly relevant for the Eurozone’s debt-distressed economies where the composition of
public debt shifted from largely being held domestically to being held externally between
2000-2008. Our work suggests that the reliance on external debt during this period would
correspond to a fiscal multiplier that turns negative and hence would worsen the downturn
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during the financial crisis.
Figure 1.1: The Composition of Public Debt in the Eurozone Periphery
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Such a conclusion may have important consequences for the fiscal consolidation pack-
ages proposed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the still-unfolding debt crisis in the
Eurozone’s periphery. Through a reduction in private sector risk premia the negative
impact from the changes in the composition of public debt can be greatly reduced. This
highlights the importance of interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the Euro-
zone and lends support to measures such as the ECB’s longer-term refinancing operations.
Our results also have important consequences regarding the reversion to pre-crisis growth.
Omitting considerations regarding the location of financing of government consumption
may erroneously lead to poorly-prescribed policies that actually deepen the recession when
advocating cuts in public expenditures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section (2) we describe the
empirical strategy used to estimate the SVAR and present results of the estimation. In
Section (3) we build a theoretical model and in Section (4) we use it to illustrate the
mechanism by undertaking a quantitative analysis. In Section (5) we report model-based
fiscal multipliers and show how are model compares to the data. In Section (6) we focus on
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the issue of imperfect capital mobility for the private sector and investigate its importance
in driving the model’s results. Finally, in Section (7) we conclude.
2 Empirical Investigation
In this section we study the eﬀects of a government spending shock and propose a strategy
for identifying whether it is financed with debt held by residents (Home-financed govern-
ment spending shock), or by nonresidents abroad (Foreign-financed government spending
shock). Our empirical procedure consists of estimating an SVAR for 59 countries, for
which data availability on the location of debt holdings is not readily available. To iden-
tify the location of debt financing we propose a novel conceptual framework, which relies
on making a single conventional assumption derived from theory.
2.1 Theoretical Background on SVARs
A Structural Vector Autoregression model (SVAR) can be written as:
A0yn,t = ↵n + A1yn,t 1 + A2yn,t 2 + ...+ APyn,t P +B"n,t (2.1)
where yn,t is a k ⇥ 1 vector of endogenous variables for a given year t and country n, ↵n
are fixed eﬀects, and where the structural errors are assumed to be white noise N (0, I k).
It is assumed that the true model can be represented via a finite lag VAR with lag
p 2 [1, 2, ..., P ]. The model in (2.1) then implies the following structural moving average
representation:
yn,t = B(L)"n,t
where B(L) is the impulse response function. However, the system in (2.1) cannot be
directly estimated, so we need to transform it into a reduced form representation:
yn,t = a
⇤
n + A
⇤
1yn,t 1 + A
⇤
2yn,t 1 + ...+ A
⇤
Pyn,t P +  n,t (2.2)
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where  n,t = A 10 B"n,t and A⇤p = A 10 Ap for p 2 [1, 2, ..., P ]. We then choose to estimate
the reduced form model (2.2) using a first diﬀerence estimator which eliminates possible
fixed eﬀects and transforms the data into stationary series. 2
In addition, (2.1) also implies the following structural moving average representation:
yn,t = C(L) n,t (2.3)
where C(L) is the non-structural impulse response function and is related to the structural
impulse responses as C(L) = A 10 B(L). By defining S = A 10 B and given the assumed
distribution of errors
P
" = I, then the impact matrix must satisfy
X
 
= SS 0 (2.4)
where
P
  is the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form errors. However, the
structural decomposition in (2.4) is not unique and the way this decomposition is chosen
will aﬀect the identification of the impact matrix in the model. For example, for some
arbitrary orthogonalization, S˜ (e.g. a Choleski decomposition), the alternative structural
decomposition can be obtained by randomly choosing a matrix H with HH 0 = I and
post-multiplying H by S˜. It is then immediate that S˜H(S˜H)0 = S˜S˜ 0 and therefore the
condition in (2.4) is satisfied. Therefore, the entire set of permissible impact matrices is
infinite and the impact matrix cannot be identified from the data. To obtain a unique
structural decomposition, the econometrician needs to assume k(k  1)/2 restrictions. In
the present paper, rather than imposing restrictions to obtain a unique identification we
obtain the distribution of impulse response functions by retaining only those that satisfy
prior constraints derived from economic theory.
2As explained in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) the first diﬀerence estimator is not consistent for T
fixed. Instead they propose to instrument lagged dependent variables by their second lags  yt 2. We
experimented with IV estimation, but the results were imprecise due to weak instruments, thus driving us
to opt for an OLS estimation. We have also estimated the model assuming fixed eﬀects in the diﬀerenced
model - the results do not change quantitatively in this case.
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2.2 Identification of Shocks
The identification methodology consist of two stages. In the first stage we separate the
(location-free) debt-financed fiscal shock from other standard shocks following the sign
restrictions methodology used in Pappa (2009). The second stage complements the sign
restrictions with additional magnitude restrictions that allow to disentangle a fiscal shock
into one that is financed with debt issued to residents, and one with debt issued to non-
residents. The constraints that we use are consistent with the model we propose in Section
(3).
Sign restrictions
Pappa (2009) shows that in both a prototypical flexible price real business cycle model
and a sticky price New Keynesian model fiscal shocks lead to an increase in output and the
primary deficit. More importantly, other standard shocks, such as technology, monetary
and demand shocks lead to an increase in output, but a fall in the primary deficit. To
identify the debt-financed fiscal shock we thus assume that it leads to an increase in
government spending, output and public debt.3
Home vs. foreign debt-financed fiscal shocks
The main question of interest is whether the source of financing of government debt is
able to diﬀerentially aﬀect the endogenous variables in our model. Thus, we have to
identify two fiscal shocks, one that is financed by issuing debt to residents (Home) and
one that is financed by issuing debt to non-residents (Foreign). The identification of these
two shocks is more challenging due to the lack of data on the composition of public debt.
The available debt data, obtained from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011) only reports ’total
gross central government debt ’ and ’total gross external debt’. However, we do not have
their disaggregated components ’total home public debt’ and ’total external public debt ’,
which would be of direct relevance for our empirical investigation. For example, looking
3The assumption that government spending increases after a (positive) fiscal shock also separates
a fiscal shock from a shock to the risk premium of external financing. A positive shock to the risk
premium would lead to a decrease in output, an increase in the government deficit, but also a decrease
in government spending.
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at equation (2.5), if data on ’total home public debt’ were available then it would be
straightforward to identify the two types of shocks of interest.
Total public debt
Total external debt
=
Public home debt + Public external debt
Public external debt + Private external debt
(2.5)
Since such variables are not available for the whole sample, we identify the two shocks
of interest by restricting the magnitudes of the responses of the endogenous variables.
The prior for the magnitudes is derived from our theoretical model, and at the same
time justified by a relatively weak assumption on the response of external debt following
the two shocks. Furthermore, we also validate our identifying assumptions by estimating
the same SVAR on US data (see Section (2.5)), a sample for which these disaggregated
components are available.4
Magnitude Restrictions
The assumption under which our magnitude restrictions are satisfied states that:
1. A positive government spending shock leads to an increase in external debt, which
is smaller than the increase in public debt.
The assumption states that any increase in government spending due to debt issuance, be
it held domestically or abroad, will lead to a current account deterioration. However, the
current account will deteriorate less than the total increase in government spending due
to import leakage. This eﬀect is validated in numerous studies that investigate the eﬀects
of government spending shocks on the trade balance (see e.g. Beetsma et al. (2008) for
the EU, or Monacelli and Perotti (2010) for the US, UK, Canada and Australia) and is
also a mechanism present in the model proposed in Section (3).5
4It is important to clarify here that we abstract from issues such as the location of debt issuance,
the currency denomination of debt, the jurisdiction of issuance, the maturity of the assets, and other
features such as which is the issuing government agency. What we are solely interested in exploring is
whether debt-financed government policy produces diﬀerential results on other macroeconomic aggregates
depending on whether the holder of debt resides within or outside the economy.
5We note that Kim and Roubini (2008)and Corsetti and Muller (2006) find that a spending shock in
the US leads to an increase in the trade balance. We conjecture that these contrasting results stem from
the alternate specification and identification methods used in these studies.
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We can now translate the assumption in the analogous magnitude restrictions that
will enable us to diﬀerentiate between the two types of shocks of interest.
Restriction 1: Home-debt financed government spending shock
By the consideration of the fiscal shock as debt-financed the increase in government spend-
ing increases total public debt. By Assumption (1) it also increases total external debt,
however by a magnitude smaller than the increase in total public debt. This is shown in
equation (2.6).
 n,t+h (public debt)    n,t+h (external debt) (2.6)
where  n,t+h (public debt) and  n,t+h (external debt) are the impulse responses of the
corresponding debt components to the identified shock. Restriction 1 states that the
increase in public debt is at least as large as the increase in external debt.
Restriction 2: Foreign-debt financed government spending shock
By the consideration of the fiscal shock as debt-financed the increase in government spend-
ing increases public debt. Given the definition of the shock, the increase of public debt
will be financed one-for-one with the increase in external debt. Assumption (1) guaran-
tees that a foreign debt-financed fiscal shock generates an additional ’accelerator eﬀect’,
whereby external debt further increases due to the deterioration of the current account
it implies. As a result, external debt increases more than public debt, which leads to the
second magnitude restriction in equation (2.7).
 n,t+h (public debt) <  n,t+h (external debt) (2.7)
where again  n,t+h (public debt) and  n,t+h (external debt) are the impulse responses of
the corresponding debt components to the identified shock. Restriction 2 states that the
increase in public debt is strictly smaller than the increase in external debt.
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Identification restrictions
The sign restrictions and magnitude restrictions that we use can be seen in Table (1).6
Table 1: Identification Restrictions
Shock G Y C I Public Debt External Debt
Home financed fiscal shock + + + +
Foreign financed fiscal shock + + + +
(a) Sign restrictions
Shock Restriction
Home financed fiscal shock   public debt     external debt
Foreign financed fiscal shock   public debt <   external debt
(b) Magnitude restrictions
Notes: We impose these restrictions to hold for 3 periods in our baseline estimation. We also experiment
with shorter horizons and conclude that the results remain substantially unaﬀected.
2.3 Data
In the baseline specification of the empirical model the vector of endogenous variables yt
contains the variables: government spending, output, household consumption, investment,
total public debt and total external debt, collected at annual frequency from 1980-2010.
For information on the data and sources see section (A) in the Appendix. All series are
6Matching the empirical results with the theoretical predictions in section (3) would necessitate ad-
ditional restrictions on the responses of government consumption and public debt. Namely, we would
need to impose that public debt increases one-for-one with government consumption. Forcing such a
restriction however, results in no accepted draws, as public debt tends to increase disproportionally more
than government consumption when no restrictions are used. We therefore calculate the distribution
of multipliers and retain only those impulse responses that are consistent with multipliers being in the
lower 5th-percentile of the distribution: we accept IRFs only if the multiplier on external debt for the
Foreign shock and the multiplier on public debt for the Home shock is lower than the corresponding
5th-percentile cut-oﬀs. This approximately corresponds to restricting the size of the multiplier on public
debt to be less than 7.5, and the size of the multiplier on external debt to a Foreign-financed shock to be
less than 15 which suggests that our estimates of absolute multipliers may be upwardly biased. However
the relative diﬀerence between the two types of shocks remains unaﬀected. In case a restriction is not
imposed qualitative results do not change, while multipliers tend to be higher in absolute terms (results
available on request).
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transformed in log diﬀerences and are set in per capita terms.7 Both types of debt are
also in real terms. We employ 2 lags of the endogenous variables as proposed by the HQ
criterion.
Following the literature on fiscal multipliers we calculate the cumulative multiplier as:
mt+s =
Pt+s
q=t  ln(Xq)Pt+s
q=t  ln(Gs)
✓
X¯
G
◆
(2.8)
where X corresponds to the endogenous variable of interest (output Y , consumption C
and investment I) and G is government consumption.
⇣
X¯
G
⌘
is the steady state of the
endogenous variable over government consumption and serves to translate the growth
rate into absolute values. We use the mean values of variables in our sample to calculate
the steady states.8
2.4 Results
We estimate the SVAR using a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Estimator.9
As can be seen from Figures (C.1) and (C.2) by distinguishing the government spending
shock as Home debt-financed and Foreign debt-financed we obtain a diﬀerential response
on the main variables of interest, investment. For a Home-debt financed government
spending shock the responses is negative whilst for a Foreign-financed government spend-
ing shock it is positive. Government spending, private consumption, public debt and
external debt increase by assumption for both shocks and output too increases in both
cases, but at diﬀerent magnitudes.
Moreover, from Figures (C.3) and (C.4) we can see that the magnitude of the output
7Outliers are identified as values diﬀering from the mean of each time series by 6-times the interquartile
range of their time series. Identified outliers are then replaced with the corresponding maximum value -
in the case of a positive value, they are replaced by the mean plus 6-times the interquartile range, and in
case of a negative value, they are replaced with the mean minus 6-times the interquartile range.
8Owyang et al. (2013) show that calculating multipliers in this ex post fashion may lead to upwardly
biased estimates. They instead follow Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011) and convert GDP and
government spending changes to the same units before the estimation. However, their framework is
based on the Jorda decomposition and is thus not possible to use this transformation in a standard VAR
specification, since here all variables must be of the same form. Nevertheless, even if the values we report
further on are upwardly biased, the result we want to emphasize is the relative diﬀerence of multipliers
between the two types of shocks, which remains unaﬀected.
9For details on the estimation algorithm see Section B in the Appendix.
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multiplier is much smaller for a Home-financed government spending shock. The impact
multipliers are approximately 1 for the Home-financed shock and approximately 3 for the
Foreign-financed shock. The biggest diﬀerence is in the investment multiplier, which is
negative for a Home-financed shock (-1.3), but positive and large for the Foreign-financed
shock (3). Moreover, we find that in 99 percent of the accepted draws the investment
multiplier is higher for a Foreign-financed shock. For output this is at 86 percent and for
consumption at 80 percent of the cases.
It is worth comparing our estimates to Ilzetzki et al. (2013), a study, which is method-
ologically and in scope closely related to ours. Using a panel SVAR the authors estimate
the dependence of fiscal multipliers on numerous country characteristics and find fiscal
multipliers that range from being negative to well over 1 depending on the characteristic
conditioned. Our results can be reconciled with these estimates as Ilzetzki et al. (2013)
look at particular subsamples, which can potentially account for countries that finance
their government spending using a mixture of both domestic and foreign debt. The higher
data frequency used in their work is another plausible reason as to why our estimates of
fiscal multipliers may diﬀer.
2.5 Robustness Checks
By changing the assumptions, sample used, or the econometric strategy we are able to
verify the robustness of our results. Notably, although in some cases our results are
weakened, it is important to mention that at least some evidence is always present in favor
of our baseline results and the economic intuition we obtain through the model. Thus,
we are never able to generate the reverse result of home-financed government spending
generating larger multipliers.
US data
In the case of the US we have available a full decomposition of the variables of interest
- we have the exact data that comprise the following ratio: public domestic debt-to-
public external debt. This allows us to test the validity of our identification strategy
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by simply including this ratio in the system and checking if the response of the ratio is
as expected, without restricting it a priori. We choose to include the ratio itself rather
than public external debt and public domestic debt in order to economize on degrees of
freedom. The expectation is that the ratio will decrease following a Home-debt financed
government spending shock and increase following a Foreign-debt financed government
spending shock. As can be seen in Figures (C.5) and (C.6) the ratio follows the anticipated
pattern. This verifies our expectations and hence lends validity to our initial identification
and estimation across the whole sample.
Alternative estimation procedures
Here, we proceed by relaxing one of the assumptions in our original shock identification,
namely that output increases following a shock to government expenditures. In order to
make the shocks mutually exclusive, we assume external debt increases after the business
cycle shock. As can be seen from Figures (C.7) and (C.8) the results are similar to our
baseline specification with the output multiplier being larger in the case of a Foreign-
financed shock.
In Figures (C.9) and (C.10) we relax the assumption of constraining the size of the
debt multiplier (see footnote 6). Whilst in Figures (C.11) and (C.12) we re-estimate our
model using fixed eﬀects in growth rates.
3 Model Environment
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of households h 2 [0, 1], of
which a fraction s are rule-of-thumb workers (w) and the remaining fraction 1   s are
saver capitalists (k). Both types of households supply labor, and capitalists supply capital
to perfectly competitive firms for the production of a final good, which is consumed
domestically. Fiscal policy is determined by a government, which finances public spending
via lump-sum taxes, one-period debt issued to resident saver capitalists, and one-period
debt issued to non-resident foreign investors.
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3.1 Preferences
Households are indexed by j 2 {w, k}. In order to lighten the notation, we drop the index
from the parameters although these can still be diﬀerent across types of households. For
each household j preferences are given by
Ut = E0
1X
t=0
 t
8><>:
⇣
Cjt    
 
njt
 '⌘1     1
1   
9>=>; (3.1)
where Et [.] is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t
and   is the subjective discount factor assumed to satisfy 0 <   < 1.  > 0 denotes
the share of labor in the utility function and   > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Cjt is CES basket that aggregates over the private consumption good c
j
t and
public consumption good Gt.
Cjt =
✓
⌘
1
⇣
 
cjt
  (⇣ 1)
⇣ + (1  ⌘)
1
⇣
(Gt)
(⇣ 1)
⇣
◆ ⇣
(⇣ 1)
(3.2)
⇣ governs the elasticity of substitution between the two types of consumption goods. For
⇣ ! 1 private and public goods are perfect substitutes, and for ⇣ ! 0 they are perfect
complements. ⌘ determines the shares of each consumption good in the basket.
Rule-of-thumb workers
Workers are assumed to behave in a rule-of-thumb fashion and in every period consume
their disposable income earned from supplying labor. Expressed in terms of the private
consumption good cwt they face the budget constraint
cwt = Wtn
w
t   ⌧wt (3.3)
where Wtnwt is labor income and ⌧wt are lump-taxes (transfers if < 0 ). The representative
worker on the interval h 2 [0, s] faces the simple optimization problem of choosing cwt and
nwt to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.3) and (3.2) taking the price Wt as given.
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Capitalists
Capitalists supply labor nkt and capital, and can borrow from the government as well as
external financial markets. Their budget constraint in terms of the private consumption
good ckt is given by
ckt + it + bh,t   bkf,t = Wtnkt + rtkt 1 +Rh,t 1bh,t 1  Rkf,t 1bkf,t 1   ⌧ kt (3.4)
where it is investment in productive capital, Wtnkt is labor income, rtkt 1 is the rent from
capital, and ⌧ kt > 0 are lump-sum taxes. bh,t and bkf,t denote the purchases of debt made
at time t from the government and external financial markets. If bh,t > 0 and bkf,t < 0 the
capitalist is a borrower. Rh,t 1bh,t 1 and Rkf,t 1bkf,t 1 denote the gross returns from debt
decisions made at time t  1.
To ensure stationarity of private foreign debt and close the model accordingly we follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and specify a debt-elastic interest rate of the form
Rkf,t =  (b
k
f,t) = r
⇤ + ⌫
⇣
exp(bkf,t   b¯kf )  1
⌘
(3.5)
The interest rate faced by capitalists Rkf,t is a sum of the world interest rate r⇤ and
a convex function of the deviation of individual debt bkf,t from its steady state value
bkf . ⌫   0 determines the sensitivity of the interest rate to debt deviations and can be
interpreted as the degree of external financial market openness for capitalists. If ⌫ = 0
capitalists have perfect access and as such can issue debt abroad at the world interest rate
Rkf,t = r
⇤. As ⌫ increases the cost of external capital increases in an exponential fashion.10
The representative capitalist on the interval h 2 [1  s, 1] chooses consumption ckt ,
labor supply nkt , as well as positions in government bonds bh,t and foreign bonds bkf,t to
maximize (3.1) subject to (3.4), (3.2) and (3.5) taking pricesWt, rt, Rh,t and Rkf,t as given.
10Notably, an alternative way to model the financial friction for capitalists would be to include portfolio
adjustment costs.
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3.2 Firms
On the production side output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function
over capital kt and total labor Nt.
F (kt 1, Nt) = ztk↵t 1N
1 ↵
t (3.6)
↵ determines the share of capital in production and zt is an exogenous total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) shock that follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient ⇢ < 1.
ln(zt) = ⇢ ln(zt 1) + "t (3.7)
Firms choose kt 1 and Nt to maximize profits taking prices as given.
3.3 Fiscal Policy
Public spending Gt is financed with total lump-sum taxes Tt = ⌧wt + ⌧ kt and debt issued
to domestic saver capitalists bh,t and foreign investors bgf,t. The government’s budget
constraint is given by
Gt   Tt = bh,t  Rh,t 1bh,t 1 + bgf,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1 (3.8)
Public expenditures are determined according to an AR(1) process with drift g > 0 and
persistence ⇢g.
Gt = 
g + ⇢gGt 1 + "
g
t (3.9)
To ensure determinacy of the equilibrium and non-explosive foreign government debt we
follow Leeper (1991) and assume total taxes are set according to a debt targeting rule of
the form
Tt = 
✓
Bt 1
B
◆⇠
(3.10)
where Bt = bh,t + bgf,t , B is the steady state value of total debt, and , ⇠   0. As in
the private sector, foreign government debt is determined by the analogous debt-elastic
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interest rate rule
Rgf,t =  (b
g
f,t) = r
⇤ + ⌫¯
 
exp(bgf,t   b¯g)  1
 
(3.11)
where ⌫   0 measures the degree of openness of external financial markets from the
perspective of the government. Possible reasons as to why external financial markets may
not be perfectly accessible to the government include sovereign risk, a history of crises,
political instability, among others. ⌫ is an important parameter as it also determines
the government’s debt portfolio. A value of ⌫ = 0 would give that foreign borrowing
is priced at the (world) risk-free interest rate rf = 1  . The government’s financing cost
minimization problem
 
minRh,t 1bh,t 1 +R
g
f,t 1b
g
f,t 1 s.t. eq. (2.8)
 
would then imply
the no-arbitrage solution Rh = Rgf = rf and hence a positive share of both domestic and
foreign debt. On the other hand, if ⌫ !1 it would become possible to generate a setting
with exclusively domestic government borrowing. In practice however, even if ⌫¯ is large
there will still be some negligible movement in domestic debt (savings) in order to finance
foreign borrowing. As a result, changes in the value of ⌫ alone cannot generate a setting
whereby government spending is financed with debt that is exclusively place at home or
abroad.
To map our theoretical exercise with the results from the data, we introduce a param-
eter     0 into the government budget constraint
Gt   Tt =   (bh,t  Rh,t 1bh,t 1)+ (1   )
 
bgf,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1
 
(3.12)
  reflects the share of government debt that is issued domestically. When   = 1 the
government surplus is financed with debt issued domestically, whereas when   = 0 it is
financed with debt issued abroad. This allows us to perfectly capture the uncontaminated
cases of a fully home-debt or foreign-debt financed spending shock. Importantly, for any
0     1 we still maintain the no-arbitrage condition Rgf,t = Rh,t as a solution to the
government minimization problem.
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3.4 Aggregation and Identities
Denote the aggregate quantity of a variable zt by Zt. Then,
Zt =
Z 1
0
zt(h)dh = sz
w
t + (1  s)zkt , z 2 {c, n}
Given that we assume that only capitalists have access to capital and asset markets,
aggregate investment, capital and debt are given by
Zt =
Z 1
0
zt(h)dh = (1  s)zkt , z 2
 
i, k, bh, b
k
f
 
Lump-sum transfers are assumed to be identical for both workers and capitalists
Zt =
Z 1
0
zt(h)dh = zt , z 2 {⌧t}
The current account CAt is defined as the sum of the trade balance TBt, and net invest-
ment income on the country’s net foreign asset position.
TBt = Yt   Ct   It  Gt (3.13)
CAt = TBt  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1  Rkf,t 1bkf,t 1 (3.14)
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy is given by aggregating the budget con-
straints of households (3.4, (3.3) and that of the government (3.8).
Ct + It +Gt = F (Kt 1, Nt) + b
g
f,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1 + bkf,t  Rkf,t 1bkf,t 1 (3.15)
4 Quantitative Analysis
This section serves to illustrate the principal mechanism at work, and provide a robust
theoretical explanation for the results we observe in the data in Section (2). As will be
shown, the crucial feature that drives the diﬀerential eﬀects of a government spending
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shock are the extent to which private investment is crowded out or in. This is a direct
consequence of whether the private sector has (im)perfect access to external financial
markets at the time that the spending shock hits the economy.
We calibrate the model by setting the discount factor to 0.99 in order to achieve
an interest rate of 1% at the baseline. Following conventional parameterization in the
macroeconomic literature we set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (for both workers
and capitalists) to 2, the share of capital in production to 0.33, the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply (for both workers and capitalists) to 1.5, the share of labor
supply in the utility function (for both workers and capitalists) to 1, and the depreciation
rate to 0.025 (see Mendoza (1991)).11 Notably, we perform the following exercise by
setting ⌘w = ⌘k = 1. That is, we do not allow for the consumption of the public good
to enter the consumption baskets of neither workers nor capitalists. In this way we rule
out the increase in private consumption that would follow a spending shock and as such
insulate output to only respond to investment. We relax this further down to show how
by generating a crowding-in of consumption we can bring the model’s responses on output
quantitatively closer to the magnitudes from our empirical investigation.
4.1 No Private Access to External Financial Markets
In what follows we assume that private access to external markets is completely restricted.
Although in theory this is achieved when ⌫ !1 we experiment with several values for ⌫
and conclude that a value of ⌫ = 50 is enough to restrict all private foreign borrowing.
Figure (D.1) plots the impulse responses following a Home-debt financed (  = 1) and
Foreign-debt financed (  = 0) government spending shock.12 The key feature, which drives
the diﬀerential changes in output across the two types of shocks is the movement in
investment. When spending is financed at home investment is crowded out, whereas
when it is financed abroad it is crowded in. The mechanism that brings about these
11In sensitivity analyses (not reported here, but available upon request) we experiment with several
other plausible values of parameters (for example s, ⌘j , ⇣j) and conclude that our results remain qualita-
tively unaﬀected.
12As each period in the model corresponds to one quarter we report mean responses across quarters to
arrive at an annual aggregation. This is done to achieve a direct comparison with the empirical results,
where the SVAR is estimated on annual data.
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Table 2: Parameter Values for Household j
Parameter Value Label
  0.99 Discount factor
r⇤ 1  World interest rate
↵ 0.33 Capital share
⌘j 1 Share of consumption in CES consumption basket
⇣j 2 Elasticity of substitution in CES consumption basket
'j 1.5 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply
s 0.5 Share of workers
  0.025 Depreciation rate
⇢ 0.9 Output persistence
  0.01 Output standard deviation
 j 2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 j 1 Share of labor supply
⌫ [0, 1) Debt-elastic interest rate coeﬃcient (household)
g 0.05 Government spending constant
⇢g 0.9 Government spending autocorrelation coeﬃcient
⌫¯ [0,1) Debt-elastic interest rate coeﬃcient (government)
 0.5 Tax rate parameter
⇠ 0.3 Tax rate exponent
results can be understood by inspecting the capitalists’ budget constraint (4.1) and the
resource constraint of the economy (4.2). Since ⌫ is large and all private foreign borrowing
is restricted, the only foreign element the resource constraint will contain are government
bonds.
ckt + it + bh,t = Wtn
k
t + rtkt 1 +Rh,t 1bh,t 1   ⌧ kt (4.1)
Ct + It +Gt = F (Kt 1, Nt) + b
g
f,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1 (4.2)
Assume that labor is constant. If spending is Home-debt financed, then to meet the
resource constraint capitalists will need to reduce their consumption and/or investment.
Due to a motivation for consumption smoothing
 
 k = 2
 
, investment will be adjusting
the most. If spending is Foreign-debt financed however then foreign government debt will
increase to buﬀer the shock. In this case we do not observe such a decline in investment.
However, labor does not remain constant because of the wealth eﬀect that the debt-
financed spending shock generates. Regardless of the source of debt financing a spending
shock leads households to increase their labor supply in response to anticipated future
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increases in taxation. The parameterization implies that the increase in labor supply is
greater for the case of a Home-financed spending shock. Strictly speaking, a Foreign-
debt financed spending should induce an additional wealth eﬀect from the lost interest
rate payments that households would otherwise receive, but in equilibrium the first eﬀect
dominates.13
Moreover, following a Foreign-debt financed spending shock the increase in investment
raises the marginal product of labor, thus incentivizing households to further increase
their labor supply in the second period. In addition, the fact that capital takes time to
build causes output to jump further.14 Finally, we also observe a deterioration in the
current account, which occurs for either spending shock. This result lends validity to the
assumptions we impose in the empirical exercise of Section (2).
At this point we do not stress the quantitative eﬀects of spending shocks, and their
translation to implied fiscal multipliers. Although it is evident that for Foreign-debt
financed spending the response of output is greater, we leave the quantitative exploration
of multipliers to Section (5).
4.2 Private Access to External Financial Markets
The results presented above rely on the fact that capitalists did not have access to foreign
financial markets. Here, we relax this condition and allow for full private access to external
financing. We do this by setting ⌫ = 0.0007. Figure (D.2) plots the impulse responses
following a Home-debt financed (  = 1) and Foreign-debt financed (  = 0) government
spending shock. The main diﬀerence is that the response of investment increases for
both types of spending shocks. Capitalists can now buﬀer the increase in spending by
borrowing from abroad.
13A utility specification, which features lower wealth eﬀects would lead to a larger diﬀerence in the
responses to the two shocks. An extension of interest (not reported here) allows for a Jaimovich-Rebelo-
type utility specification (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009), where the strength of wealth eﬀects can be
altered. We observed that weaker wealth eﬀects led to a larger diﬀerence in the output responses to the
two shocks.
14If we had not aggregated the responses at an annual frequency then the response of output following
a Foreign-financed government spending shock would not necessarily be larger on impact. To circumvent
this, we also experimented with a model for productive government investment (not reported here), which
eliminates this possibility.
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In order to reconcile the two polar cases of the private sector’s access to external
financing we experiment with the value of the private debt-elastic parameter within the
range 0  ⌫ < 0.03. Figure (D.3) plots the responses of investment following a Home-debt
financed (  = 1) and Foreign-debt financed (  = 0) spending shock for diﬀerent values of
the private sector’s debt-elasticity parameter. As agents provide more labor in response
to both shocks the marginal return to capital increases and agents are incentivized to
invest. When the shock is financed abroad investment therefore always increases. On the
other hand, for a domestically financed shock the response of investment depends on ⌫.
When ⌫ is low agents borrow externally to finance their investment and take advantage
of the increased marginal return to capital. However, when ⌫ is high external borrowing
becomes prohibitively costly and investment falls as agents are obliged to spend a large
share of their income to purchase government bonds.
5 Fiscal Multipliers
This section focuses on bridging the gap between the empirical investigation and the
model-based analysis. We proceed by searching for combinations of model parameters
that following a spending shock will replicate the magnitudes of the cumulative fiscal
multipliers in the data. The intention is to evaluate whether the obtained parameter
values are comparable to estimates in the literature. In this way we can establish whether
plausible parameterizations of the model can explain the data quantitatively.
We categorize the set of parameters ✓ = (✓1, ✓2), where ✓1 represents (deep) parameters,
which we keep fixed to the same values as in Table (2). ✓2 are parameters, which we
have identified to play a role in significantly altering the quantitative responses of the
variables in the model, in particular that of private consumption. ✓2 includes the shares
of the government consumption good in the aggregate consumption basket, ⌘w and ⌘k,
the strength of complementarity between private and public consumption in the CES
aggregator, ⇣w and ⇣k, and the share of rule-of-thumb workers s. We search for the
✓2 parameter values (see Table (3)), which will minimize the distance between impact
multipliers from the model with those of the data. For certain combinations (namely
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when ⌘j and/or s are above a certain threshold), a spending shock will generally lead
to a crowding in of private consumption. Combined with the movements in investment
(especially for a foreign debt financed shock) a spending shock under this parameterization
will tend to produce greater impact multipliers. Thus making the results consistent with
the relatively large multipliers we obtain in the data (3 with foreign financing, 1 for a
home financing).
Table 3: Parameter values for matching impulse responses
✓2
⌘w {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} Share of private consumption in CES (workers)
⌘k {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} Share of private consumption in CES (capitalists)
⇣w {1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2} El. subst. between private and public goods (workers)
⇣k {1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2} El. subst. between private and public goods (capitalists)
s {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} Share of rule-of-thumb workers
By solving the model across all ✓2 parameter combinations we obtain 55 impulse re-
sponse functions for each shock.15 Based on these we construct multipliers for each com-
bination by following the definition used in the empirical investigation presented above.
Consistent with Equation (2.8) the model-based multiplier is defined as
Multiplier =
 yt
 gt
✓
Y
G
◆
, t = 0, ..., T
and reads as the change in real GDP  yt caused by a 1% increase in government spending
 gt, scaled by the ratio of steady state output to that of government spending
⇣
Y
G
⌘
. At
time t = 0 we obtain the impact multiplier. Figures(E.1) and (E.2) plot the various
responses of investment for the full set of parameter combinations. It is evident that
for the vast majority of cases the response of investment is as expected, positive for a
home-debt financed government shock and negative otherwise.
In order to make a formal comparison of output impact multipliers between model
and data we minimize the sum of squared diﬀerences between the model- and data-
generated output impact multipliers. To avoid indeterminacies, when simulating a home-
15We opt for a coarse grid rather than a continuous interval as certain parameterizations render the
solution indeterminate.
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debt financed spending shock we set ⌫ = 50 , whilst when simulating a foreign-debt
financed spending shock we set ⌫ = 0. We also let ⌫ = 50 as this case induces investment
to respond in opposite directions following each spending shock. The latter will imply
impact multipliers, which correspond to an upper bound.
Let  j (✓2) denote the output multiplier to a debt-financed spending shock "j, where
j = h corresponds to a home-debt financed spending shock (  = 1) and j = f to a
foreign-debt financed spending shock (  = 0).16 In turn,  ˆj denotes the estimated output
multiplier generated by the SVAR.17The minimum distance matrix is then defined as:
  (✓2) = argmin
✓2
 
( h (✓2)   ˆh)2   ( f (✓2)   ˆf )2
 2 (5.1)
Figure (E.3) plot cumulative multipliers for output, investment and consumption for
the parameter combination that minimizes the distance matrix in (5.1). The impact
multiplier on output is 2.47 for a Foreign-shock and 1.64 for a Home-shock. For the case
of a Foreign-shock the model slightly undershoots the impact multiplier (3 in the data),
whilst for the case of the Home-shock it slightly overshoots it (1 in the data). In similar
fashion, the impact multiplier for investment for a Foreign-shock is 0.19 (3 in the data)
and -1.1 for a Home-shock (-1.3 in the data), whilst is 0.84 for consumption (3.1 in the
data) and 0.42 (0 in the data) respectively for a Foreign- and Home-shock. Notably, the
parameter combinations, which achieve these results are s = 0.4, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1
⇣w = 1.6 and ⌘w = 0.9. We note that these values are by no means implausible or outliers
to the literature.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to better understand the eﬀects from having s = 0.4, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1 ⇣w = 1.6
and ⌘w = 0.9 we proceed by altering subsets of ✓2, whilst keeping the remaining parameters
16Formally, the output multiplier should be denoted as  j (✓2, ✓1), as the the model also contains ✓1-type
parameters. However, by setting ✓1 fixed we omit them from the notation.
17As we are interested in only matching theoretical to empirical output multipliers, we implicitly
abstract from making assumptions regarding the horizon of the VAR representation of the structural
model. The only assumption we make is that the structural model indeed admits a structural VAR, to
the extent that its reduced-form representation provides us with multipliers that are informative for the
structural model’s parameters.
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fixed either at the baseline calibration in table (2) or at the values minimizing (5.1).
Utility-enhancing government spending
⌘k determines the weight of the public consumption good in the consumption basket for
capitalists, whereas the parameter ⇣k governs the strength of the complementarity between
capitalist consumption of the private consumption good and capitalist consumption of the
public good. Figure (E.4) plots the diﬀerence in the output multiplier following the two
types of government spending shock for diﬀerent levels of these parameters. The left panel
assumes no access to external financial markets by the private sector ⌫ = 50, whereas the
right panel assumes a case of perfect access ⌫ = 0.
Share of rule-of-thumb households
Figure (E.5) plots output multipliers following the two types of government spending shock
for diﬀerent shares of rule-of-thumb worker households. The remaining parameters are
fixed at their distance-minimizing values. Overall, we observe that Foreign-debt financed
shocks lead to higher output multipliers across all simulations. However, increasing the
share of rule-of-thumb households decreases both multipliers and even reduces them to 0
for extreme values (s = 1). This is because as capitalists are depleted from the aggrega-
tion, the more is productive investment displaced, leading to lower output responses. It
turns out that this eﬀect dominates the increased response of consumption due the high
share of rule-of-thumb-workers.
6 Country Characteristics
It is evident that the key mechanism through which the theoretical results are obtained are
due to crowding out of private investment and the extent to which the private sector has
access to external financial markets. For this reason we return to the data. In the spirit
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) we re-estimate the SVAR by conditioning on country characteristics
that proxy for access to external financial markets. This will enable us to better reconcile
the empirical results with those of the theoretical model.
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We consider the following three measures of financial market openness: i) the share of
loans from non-resident banks to GDP, ii) the number of crisis events, and iii) the variance
of output. For the first measure we postulate that a country with a higher share of non-
resident bank will have better access to foreign financial markets. Recent studies that
make use of this measure, especially for cases of developing countries are Bandyopadhyay
et al. (2012) among others. The other two measures are straightforward as it crises and
real volatility are typically associated with risking risk premia.
Figure (F.1) reports the associated impact multipliers for output, consumption and
investment following the two types of spending shocks. For all endogenous variables and
across all measures, the results show that the diﬀerence in multipliers following each shock
is smaller for countries with thinner access to external markets than for countries with
thicker access. For example, for countries with a high variance of output, the impact
multiplier on output following a Home-debt financed shock is 2.64, whereas following a
Foreign-debt financed shock it is 5. For the countries with a low variance of output the
respective impact multipliers are 0.81 and 5.60. As the relative diﬀerence in multipliers
is smaller for the high output variance subsamples, we conclude that this verifies our
theoretical predictions that a country’s ability to borrow from abroad is a crucial feature
in generating asymmetries. The share of accepted models where the output multiplier is
larger for a Foreign shock over a Home shock is 71% for countries with high access and
97% for countries with low access.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have asked the question: how do fiscal multipliers diﬀer if a fiscal shock is
financed with home debt, or foreign debt. To answer this question we have estimated an
SVAR identified by placing conventional sign restrictions on the movement of endogenous
variables and by complementing them with magnitude restrictions on the movement of
government debt. For several specifications of the SVAR we find that fiscal multipliers are
larger when government spending is financed by debt that is held in a foreign economy.
We validate our econometric methodology by building a model that can account for
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these asymmetries. The fundamental mechanism that brings about this diﬀerential eﬀect
of government spending financing is the extent to which private investment is crowded out
or in following the two types of government spending shocks. When the private sector can
obtain access to foreign borrowing then investment tends to be crowded in for both types
of government spending shock and output multipliers are qualitatively similar. When
private access to foreign borrowing is completely restricted then the diﬀerence between the
two shocks is most emphasized. The share of rule-of-thumb workers and the specification
of households’s preferences, in particular the extent to which government consumption
can become utility enhancing, generate model-based multipliers that are consistent with
those of the data. Policymakers dealing with the still-unfolding Eurozone crisis should
take these asymmetries into consideration as advocating cuts in expenditures could result
in deeper and miscalculated recessions.
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A Data and variables
Unless stated otherwise nominal values are converted to real values using the price deflator
for private consumption expenditures. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
Public Debt. The sum of total domestic and total external gross central government
debt-to-GDP.Whenever central government debt is not available we replace it with general
government debt. Source: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011)
External Debt. The sum of total public and total private gross external debt-to-
GDP. Source: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011)
Output. Yt is gross domestic product. Source: World Bank
Government Expenditures. Gt is general government final consumption expendi-
ture. Source: World Bank
Consumption. Ctis final consumption expenditure. Source: World Bank
Investment. It is gross fixed capital formation. Source: World Bank
List of Countries in sample: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela, Zambia.
B Estimation algorithm
The estimation procedure consists of three steps. In the first step, we estimate the reduced
form VAR model. In the second step, we identify the structural shocks and in the third
step we take into account estimation uncertainty. The steps are:
1. Estimate reduced form VAR: Given the number of lags proposed by Hannan-
Quinn (HQ) or Bayesian Information criterion (BIC), bp, V AR(bp) is estimated by
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with fixed eﬀects to obtain an estimate of autore-
gressive coeﬃcients and the variance-covariance of reduced form errors, c⌃u.
2. Identification restrictions: non-structural impulse responses function, C(L), is
related to the structural impulse responses function as B(L) = A 10 C(L) and re-
duced form errors, ut, are related to structural errors as ut = A 10 B"t. Impact
matrix, S = A 10 B, must satisfy”
⌃u = SS
0 (B.1)
The estimate of impact matrix, bS, is obtained by Cholesky decomposition of es-
timated variance-covariance of reduced form errors, bS = chol(c⌃u). We use non-
uniqueness of the representation in (B.1) to derive the distribution of impulse re-
sponse functions by sign restrictions:
• First, the k ⇥ k matrix P is constructed with draws from a standard normal
distribution, N (0, 1).
• The QR decomposition of P is derived, such that P = QR and QQ0 = I.
• The new impact matrix is constructed as bD = bSQ, and the corresponding
impulse responses function is retained whenever it satisfies sign restrictions.
• The steps 2-2 are repeated 1000 times. The IRF’s distribution is obtained by
retaining the impulse responses functions that satisfy sign restrictions.
3. Estimation uncertainty: to account for estimation uncertainty, we repeat steps
1-2 1000 times, each time with a new artificially constructed data sample, Y ⇤.
To construct data samples, we use block bootstrap, where blocks are individual
countries. The countries are selected by random drawing with replacement from the
pool of countries in original data set. The length of new data sample, n, is the same
as length of original data set.
The IRF’s point estimates and the related confidence bands are constructed by retaining
the median along with the relevant percentiles of the distribution of retained IRFs.
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C Empirical Results
Baseline (section 2.4)
Figure C.1: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt - baseline estimates
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the baseline case with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption,
real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard
deviation.
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Figure C.2: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - baseline estimates
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the baseline case with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption,
real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard
deviation.
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Figure C.3: Cumulative multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home debt - baseline estimates
Multiplier − Home financed G shock   
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Notes: the cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log diﬀerence of variable of interest over
the log diﬀerence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output, consumption and investment.
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Figure C.4: Cumulative multipliers to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - baseline estimates
Multiplier − Foreign financed G shock
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Notes: the cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log diﬀerence of variable of interest over
the log diﬀerence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output, consumption and investment.
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Robustness checks: US (section 2.5)
Figure C.5: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt - US
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Notes: IFs are presented for the US with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real invest-
ment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure C.6: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - US
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Notes: IFs are presented for the US with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real invest-
ment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Robustness checks: no restrictions on output (section 2.5)
Figure C.7: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt - output unrestricted
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure C.8: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - output unrestricted.
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Robustness checks: no restrictions on debt multipliers (section 2.5)
Figure C.9: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt - debt multipliers unrestricted
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure C.10: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - debt multipliers unrestricted
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Robustness checks: estimation with fixed eﬀects (section 2.5)
Figure C.11: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt - fixed eﬀects
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure C.12: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt - fixed eﬀects
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Notes: IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real investment,
public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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D Theoretical model
No private access to external financial markets (section 4.1)
Figure D.1: IRFs following a home-debt financed and foreign-debt financed government spending
shock
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Notes: 100% home-financed shock,   = 1 (dashed red line), 100% foreign-financed shock,
  = 0 (solid blue line). No private access to external financial markets (⌫ = 50).
Each period corresponds to one year.
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Private access to external financial markets(section 4.2)
Figure D.2: IRFs following a home-debt financed and foreign-debt financed government spending
shock
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Notes: 100% home-financed shock,   = 1 (dashed red line), 100% foreign-financed shock,
  = 0 (solid blue line). Perfect private access to external financial markets
(⌫ = 0.0007). Each period corresponds to one year.
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Figure D.3: Diﬀerence in the responses of investment following a home-debt financed and a
foreign-debt financed shock to government spending
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Notes: the top panel plots the diﬀerence in the responses of investment following a home-
debt financed government spending shock,   = 1. The middle panel plots the diﬀerence
in the responses of investment following a foreign-debt financed government spending
shock,   = 0. For both cases the private interest rate debt-elasticity varies between ⌫ = 0
(blue solid line), ⌫ = 0.001 (green dashed line), ⌫ = 0.03 (red dashed line). The bottom
panel denotes the diﬀerences in the two responses of investment for a range of the private
interest rate debt-elasticity. Each period corresponds to one year.
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E Fiscal Multipliers
Matching empirical multipliers (section 5)
Figure E.1: Investment multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home debt
  = 1 (annualized)
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Figure E.2: Investment multipliers to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt
  = 0 (annualized)
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Figure E.3: Multipliers for output, consumption and investment to a spending shock financed
with home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0 (annualized). Parameters are set to: s = 0.4, ⇣k =
1.4, ⌘k = 0.1, ⇣w = 1.6, ⌘w = 0.9
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Sensitivity analysis (section 5.1)
Figure E.4: Diﬀerence in impact output multipliers to a government spending shock financed
with home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
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Left panel: no access ⌫¯ = 50. Right panel: complete access ⌫¯ = 0. Remaining parameters
are set at baseline calibration (see table 2)
Figure E.5: Multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home   = 1 or foreign
debt   = 0
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Shares of rule-of-thumb consumers s = {0.40.6, 0.8, 1}. Remaining parameters are fixed
at ⌫¯ = 50, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1, ⇣w = 1.6, ⌘w = 0.9. Each period corresponds to
one year.
50
F Country Characteristics (section 6)
Figure F.1: Impact Multipliers based on Diﬀerent Country Characteristics - Access to Financial Markets Proxies
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The Figure presents impact multipliers (in bold) for Y, C and I following a spending shock financed with home debt and foreign debt.
Values to the left and right of the impact multiplier represent upper and lower bounds of one-standard deviation confidence intervals.
High and Low Access diﬀerentiates the sample according to whether the country belongs above, or below the mean of the sample for each
proxy (see section 6).
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